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ON PASCAL'S WAGER AND INFINITE UTILITIES
John By!

In this paper I discuss some objections to Pascals' Wager based on the notion
of an infinite utility. It is alleged that infinite utilities result in decisional and
mathematical indeterminacies that invalidate Pascal's Wager. Although various resolutions to these objections have been proposed, these in turn have
shortcomings. It is argued that the indeterminacies can be readily avoided by
treating the infinities as limits. It is suggested that, in situations where only
one bet can be placed, the expected utility should be replaced by the most
probable average utility. By this standard the Wager is found to fall short if
the probability of God's existence is taken to be small.

Pascal's Wager purports to demonstrate that it is rational to try to bring about
theistic belief. The form of Pascal's Wager that concerns us goes as follows.
If God exists, the pay-off to the believer is infinite; if God does not exist the
loss to the believer and the gain to the non-believer are both finite. Hence as
long as there is a finite chance, no matter how small, that God exists the
expectation of belief exceeds that of unbelief. Thus it is rational to take steps
to bring about belief.
Various objections have been raised against the usage of infinity in this
argument. 1 These involve primarily the charge that infinite pay-offs give rise
to decisional and mathematical indeterminacies. While these objections have
recently been responded to by Jeffrey Jordan,2 his resolution in turn exhibits
some deficiencies. I shall propose a simple alternative approach for dealing
with the indeterminacy objections.
The Wager differs from most wagers in that everything must be staked on
one bet. In such cases it is questionable whether the expected utility is the
proper criterion to use. In the final section I shall discuss an alternative, the
most probable average utility, which seems to be more rational.

I
The first objection to the usage of infinite utilities goes as follows. Suppose
we can choose two courses of action. Action A makes an infinite reward likely
with a probability of 0.5; action B with probability 0.001. The utility of an
outcome consists of the benefits that would result if that outcome obtains;
the expected utility of an act is determined by multiplying the utility of each
possible outcome of the act with its associated probability. In this case the
expected utilities for acts A and B are given by:
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EU(A)

= (0.5)(00) + (0.5)(0) = 00

2.

EU(B)

= (0.001)(00) + (.999)(0) = 00

It seems that EU(A) = EU(B). Since the expectation is infinite for both A and

B, why should we choose A? Here we have what Jordan calls a decisional
indeterminacy: it would be rational to choose the act leading to the larger
expected utility, but here the two are equal and we can thus make no rational
choice on the basis of expected utility.
Jordan accepts the equality of the two expected utilities and concurs that
the Wager, in its original form, fails. However, he asserts that the Wager can
be saved by augmenting it with an additional decision-theoretic principle. He
defends the plausibility of the principle that, if a number of acts all have
infinite expected utility, one should perform that one that is most likely to
bring about the pay-off.
While this principle does not seem unreasonable, and while it does seem
to rescue Pascal's Wager in this particular case, it has a rather limited range
of application. As we shall see in the next section, Jordan must construct a
different method to solve various mathematical indeterminacies. We shall
now present a simple alternative approach that resolves both types of indeterminacies.
Consider how the infinite utilities arise. Pascal writes:
.. .it would be foolish of you when you are forced to gamble not to risk your
life in order to win three lives in a game. But in fact there is an eternity of
life and of happiness at stake. 3

The emphasis here is on the fact that the future life is eternal. One must
choose between an eternity of happiness on the one hand or an eternity of
annihilation or wretchedness on the other hand. 4 Eternity starts at death and
goes on forever. 5
Let us therefore take the infinite utility to arise primarily from the notion
of an unending happy existence, the essential characteristic being that of
unbounded time. Suppose that the infinite reward consists of H units of
happiness per day multiplied by an endless number of days. For believers H
would be some large positive number corresponding to an appropriate state
of happiness; for unbelievers H would be zero (for annihilation) or some large
negative number corresponding to an appropriate state of wretchedness. We
could then consider the infinite utility to be the limit of HT, where T is a
large number of days, as T increases to infinity. Taking the future life as
consisting of a finite time T, the expected utilities of acts A and Bare:
3.

EU(A) = (0.5)(HT) +(0.5)(0) = 0.5 HT

4.

EU(B) = (O.OOI)(HT) +(0.999)(0) = 0.001 HT
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The relative utility is EU(A)/EU(B) = (0.5 HT)/(O.OOI HT) = 500. Since T
always cancels out, this result will hold even as T increases to infinity:
5.

limT->~

[EU(A)IEU(B)] =

IimT->~

[(0.5HT)/(0.00lHT)] = 500

In short, we still merely choose that act that will maximize the relative
expected utility. Hence the indeterminacy can readily be removed by taking
the limit of a finite quantity as it increases to infinity. No additional decision-theoretic principle need be applied.
Note that this is similar to the question of who is richer: person A who
accumulates x dollars per day for an eternity, or person B who accumulates
2x dollars a day for the same eternity? It is clear that at any particular time
B will be twice as rich as A. Thus B will always be richer than A, even though
both ultimately become infinitely rich. In the case that both options are
equally likely, the limit approach to the expectations will prefer B. Jordan's
principle, however, breaks down here since both options have an infinite
utility and have equal probability, leading to a decision indeterminacy.
If it be insisted that the infinite reward is actually a double infinity of an
eternity of infinite happiness, this could be handled in a similar fashion by
taking also the limit of a boundless H as it approaches infinity.
One might object that the infinity thus approached is only a potential
infinity, not an actual completed infinity. To this we respond that, first of all.
it is not clear that Pascal's Wager requires an actual, completed infinity. All
that is necessary is that this timespan is greater than any finite number we
can think of. Certainly, from a human point of view, the future eternity is
only an indefinite, potential infinite that will never be completed. Moreover,
it is evident that if, as in the above example, a quantity has the same value
at any future time then this value will be valid for all eternity, regardless as
to whether we consider this eternity to be an actual completed infinity or
merely a potential infinity.
The limit approach has the advantage of being compatible with standard
Bayesian principles, except for the fact that many standard formulations of
Bayesian theory reject unbounded utilities. Since unbounded utilities are
realistic (at least for those who believe, along with Pascal, in a future eternity), any incompatibility of such utilities with Bayesian principles must be
considered a deficiency in Bayesian theory.

II
A second indeterminacy arises as follows. Suppose there is a very small
probability that there exists a devil who punishes theistic believers with
infinite hell. Jordan considers the case where a certain act (belief in a theistic
god) has a (0.45-x) probability of bringing about an infinite outcome
(heaven), a 0.55 probability of no afterlife and a very remote probability of
x resulting in an infinite disutility (hell). The EU of this act would be:
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EU = (0.45-x)(00) +(0.55)r +(x)(-oo) = 00 + -00 = ?

where r is a finite utility and x is a very small number. In this case we seem
to have a mathematical indeterminacy. How can we decide what value the
EU should have?
Jordan accepts the view that the mathematical indeterminacy is real. His
resolution is to remove the infinite disutility (-00) from the calculation. He
justifies this on the ground that this possibility is so remote that it warrants
nothing but neglect.
One might object that any non-zero probability, however small, multiplied
by infinity still yields an infinite utility. To this Jordan responds that every
act carries with it possible outcomes that involve infinite utilities, since every
act might be punished with an infinite disutility by some bizarre god. Hence
every act carries with it the above sort of indeterminacy. Thus, Jordan argues,
just as we properly neglect very remote decisions in mundane decisions, we
are justified in doing so in Pascali an decisions also.
He concedes, however, that if x is as large as 0.01 then the indeterminacy
is not thus removable. Jordan then goes on to argue that the latter case is,
from Pascal's point of view, not realistic: Pascal directed his Wager against
people for whom the only real outcomes were either theism or naturalism.
They would not have attached much value to x. Thus, according to Jordan,
we are justified in ignoring the indeterminacy.
Frankly, I don't find this resolution very convincing. First of all, the removal of the infinity disutility strikes me as directly contrary to the spirit of
Pascal's Wager. Pascal argued that as long as there was any finite chance that
God exits - no matter how small - then infinite reward will favour the EU
for belief. In the words of Pascal:
For in this game you can win eternal life, eternal happiness. You have one
chance of winning against a finite number of chances of losing, and what
you are staking is almost nothing. Surely that settles it. Wherever there is
infinity, and where there is not an infinity of chances of losing against the
chance of winning, why hesitate? Surely you must stake everything then. 6

Pascal does not allow for some finite threshold probability that allows us to
ignore remote but non-zero possibilities. Such a manoeuvre would permit
naturalists to defuse the Wager by assigning sufficiently low probability to
God's existence and then removing the infinite utility. Also, Jordan leaves
Pascal's Wager as indeterminate, thereby invalidating it, for those who estimate
probability x to be small but still non-negligible (e.g., in the order of 0.01).
These difficulties arise because Jordan again concedes too much strength
to the objection. An easier resolution is to use the same approach as above.
Again, take T as the number of days in the life here-after and take the limit
as T approaches infinity. This yields:
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limT.... ~ [(0.45-x)HT +0.55 r +(x)(-HT)] = limT-->= [(0.45-2x)HT +0.55
r] = +00

for x < 0.225. Thus, as long as the probability of God's existence outweighs
that of the disutility, the EU is positive infinity.
This is similar to the question of what our assets would be if we acquire
2x dollars a day for an eternity but spend x dollars per day. It is clear that,
however far we look into the future, our income will always exceed our
expenses and our net assets will increase to +00, rather than ending up as an
indeterminate [00 + -00].
In summary, the infinite utilities in Pascal's wager need not involve any
decisional or mathematical indeterminacies. Nor do they require any augmentation of the standard version of the Wager with certain decision-theoretic
principles. Of course, this conclusion does not demonstrate the validity of
Pascal's Wager; it only asserts that the usage of infinite utilities need not, in
itself, be problematic.

III
While I have thus far defended Pascal's Wager, I am nevertheless convinced
that it is flawed. What concerns me is the fact that the Wager, unlike most
gambling games, asks us to stake everything on one bet. The obvious significance of an infinite utility for an outcome is that, even though that outcome
may be very improbable, it still generates an infinite expected utility. Yet I
wonder whether in such cases the EU is indeed the pertinent quantity that
should determine our rational choice.
Consider a simple example. Suppose we have an opportunity to stake our
entire fortune (say $100,000) on a 0.001 chance of winning a billion dollars.
The expectation of betting is
8.

EU(bet) = (.999)(0) + (0.001)(1,000,000,000)= 1.000,000

If we refrain from betting, thereby keeping our $100,000, the expectation is
EU(no bet) = 0)(100,000) = 100,000. Thus, by Pascal's logic we would be

foolish not to bet. Yet if we do bet we stand a very good chance (99.9%) of
losing everything. Out of every thousand persons who take on the bet all but
one ends up bankrupt. Is it then really rational to risk the family fortune on
such a long-shot, even if the possible reward may be very great?
The difficulty is that the EU will yield us the average expected winnings
only in the long run, if we bet many times. If we can place only a few bets
than it seems more rational to consider the most probable average utility
(hereafter referred to as MU): the most probable distribution of outcomes,
multiplied by their respective utilities and then averaged. If we bet n times
then the most probable distribution of outcomes with probabilities (pI, p2, ... )
will be (np!, np2, ... ), rounded off to the nearest integer. Thus, in the above
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case, if we can place 10000 bets the most probable distribution for probabilities (.999, 0.001) is (9990, 10). Then the MD is given by:
9.

MU(bel)

= [(9990)(0) + (10)(1,000,000,000)]110000 = 1,000,000

In this case it would certainly be rational to bet. Note that here the MD equals
the ED. This will always be the case if n, the number of bets, is sufficiently
large. For small n, however, this will not hold true, particularly not for n =
1. In that case the probability distribution (0.999, 0.001) leads to a most
probable outcome of (1, 0). This yields an MD:
10. MU(hel)

= [(1)(0) + (0)(1,000,000,000)]11 = 0

This compares with a MD(no bet) of 100,000.
I maintain that in such situations as these, where everything is risked on a
small number of bets, it is MD, rather than ED, that should be used when
comparing the values of different acts. Let me stress that I am concerned here
only with high-risk situations: there may well be low-risk cases where one
might be rationally justified in a single-case bet on a low-probability outcome. Of course, when the relative probabilities are of the same order (e.g.,
a 49% chance of winning) the matter becomes less clear.
To illustrate this further, consider the St. Petersburg Paradox. This "paradox" is often raised in discussions of Pascal's Wager; Jordan also brings it
up. In the St. Petersburg game one gets a pay-off of 2m if the first "heads"
appears on the mth toss. The probability of the first "heads" appearing on the
nth toss is 2m. The ED is therefore:
11. EU

= 0/2)(2) + (114)(4)

+ (1/8)(8) ... = 1 + I + 1+ ...

=

00

The paradox is that, even though the ED is infinite, in practice no one would
pay much to play the game. How can it be resolved? Jordan suggests that we
should simply ignore the higher m's since their probabilities are very small.
This seems to me to be not only unwarranted, but also contrary to the spirit
of the Wager, where even small probabilities can lead to a significant ED. I
suggest that, here, too, it is more instructive to consider the MD, rather than
the ED. The probability distribution is (1/2, 1/4, 1/8, ... ). Thus for n = 1 we
have a most probable outcome distribution of (1/2, 114, 1/8, ... ) which rounds
off to (1, 0, 0, ... ), yielding:
12. MU(l)

= [(1)(2)]11 =2

For n = 3 we get a most probable outcome distribution of (2, 1,0, ... ) yielding
13. MU(3) = [(2)(2) + (1)(4)]/3 = 8/3

For n = 7 the most probable outcome distribution is (4, 2, 1,0, ... ), with
14. MU(7) = [(4)(2) + (2)(4) + (1)(8)]17 = 2417
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In general, it turns out that
15. MU(n)

= [en + 1)( log2 (n+l»]ln

Thus the value of the game as determined by the MU depends on how often
you play, increasing to infinity only as n approaches infinity. This resolves
the paradox: we can expect an infinite average payoff only if we play infinitely often; for a finite number of plays we can expect only a finite average
payoff. Once again, the MU seems more pertinent than the EU as a criterion
for rational choice.
What about Pascal's Wager? On the basis of expected utility, Pascal argues
that it is rational to risk one life to gain an infinity of lives, as long as the
chance of God's existence is non-zero. Yet, if this chance is small, say 0.01,
the most probable distribution of outcomes is (.99, 0.01), which rounds off
to (1, 0) and we have:
16. MU(belief) = (1)(0) + (0)(00) = 0
17. MU (nonbelief)

= (1)(1) + (0)(0) = 1 life

Thus, using the MU criterion, the nonbeliever may be pardoned for hesitating
to risk his entire life for a one percent chance that God exists. From this point
of view the Wager works only if the probability of God's existence can be
shown to be considerably higher. To the extent that this requires additional
lines of argumentation, it significantly weakens the Wager.
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